The Future of the Alliance
The Future of the Alliance
By Michael Oren
Supporters of Israel are intensely interested in which of two presidential candidates, John McCain or Barack Obama, is “best” for the Jewish state. Of course, “best” is an inherently subjective concept, colored by whether one regards settlements as beneficial or disastrous for Israel, for example, or the creation of a Palestinian state as essential or deadly. The word also assumes a substantial degree of familiarity with the candidates’ positions on issues that impact Israel either directly or collaterally. Attaining such clarity from politicians is difficult even in normal times. But during an election year, it is especially daunting. Speeches by presidential hopefuls geared to special constituencies, statements from commentators and aides, misquotes and gaffes-together these can cloud the contenders’ platforms, particularly on matters as complex and controversial as the Middle East. Moreover, more than a little disinformation on Obama and McCain has been disseminated by opponents and interested parties, further obscuring their true views.
Nevertheless, by carefully combing the mass of speeches, interviews, and press releases, a picture of the candidates’ policies can still be culled. A map of where Obama and McCain stand on the peace process and other issues crucial to Israel-the War on Terror, the Iraq War, Iranian nuclearization-may be drawn, and points of distinction flagged. And on the basis of these findings, it is possible to speculate how a McCain or an Obama presidency might interact with Israel, to its benefit as well as its detriment.
After Bush
By necessity, any analysis of the policies of the two candidates must begin with an assessment of the legacy that the president-elect will inherit. During his eight years in office, George W. Bush established new standards for the term “pro-Israel.” He repeatedly affirmed Israel’s right to defend itself against terror, and praised its value as America’s primary Middle Eastern ally. He also expressed a deep ideological attachment to Israel as a democracy and, spiritually, to Israel as the biblical homeland. “You have raised a modern society in the Promised Land, a light unto the nations… [and] a mighty democracy,” he told the Knesset during Israel’s sixtieth anniversary celebrations.[1]
On the peace process, by comparison, Bush was less categorical. He became the first American president publicly to endorse the emergence of a Palestinian state and, to that end, he opposed the expansion of Israel’s West Bank settlements. Yet Bush also rejected a large-scale repatriation of Palestinian refugees to Israel as well as a return to Israel’s 1967 borders, insisting that any treaty take into account the “current realities” created by the settlements. He refused to deal with Hamas and Hezbollah, even obliquely, portraying them apocalyptically as the embodiments of “darkness” and “evil.” More radically still, Bush reversed the formula, embedded in UN Resolution 242, of territory-for-peace. If previous presidents required Israel to relinquish territory first and only then receive peace from the Arabs, Bush demanded that the Arabs recognize Israel’s existence and renounce violence in advance of retrieving captured land.
Bush’s policies disappointed many on the Israeli left who longed for a more activist American role in peace-making, and antagonized Israeli rightists who resented his support for Palestinian sovereignty and his demands for a settlement freeze. Still, Bush remained singularly popular in Israel-considerably more so, in fact, than in the United States. “You have been a true leader,” Benjamin Netanyahu, head of the Likud opposition, lauded the president in Knesset. “You have never hesitated from fighting tyranny and defending freedom.”[2]
The pro-Israel paradigm established by Bush poses a hefty challenge for Obama and McCain. Neither candidate, though, has shied from meeting it. In spite of some initial questions surrounding his affection for Israel, Obama has been unexceptionally Zionist, asserting that “the idea of a secure Jewish state is a fundamentally just idea,” and that “Israel’s security is sacrosanct.”[3]
McCain and Obama have both pledged to maintain Israel’s strategic edge by supporting Bush’s proposal for increasing military aid to the Jewish State by $30 billion over the next decade. Both have called on the Arab states to recognize Israel in advance of Israeli territorial concessions; both have vowed to take an active, hands-on, role in the search for peace. Nevertheless, in their approach to that process, and their conception of its outcome, the candidates evince some subtle-and potentially significant-differences.
Parsing the Palestinian question
Take, for example, the issues of Israeli settlements and the borders of any future Palestinian state. While McCain has avoided criticizing Israel’s settlement policy and balked at delineating the contours of “Palestine,” Obama has impugned the settlements and taken up Bush’s call for a “contiguous” Palestinian state free of Israeli roadblocks and joined by West Bank-to-Gaza routes. McCain, who did not meet with Palestinian leaders during his Israel visit, has emphasized the Palestinian Authority’s duty to clamp down on terror in accordance with the Road Map “We must ensure that Israel’s people can live in safety until there is a Palestinian leadership willing and able to deliver peace,” he stated.[4]
Obama and McCain have also differed over aspects of Israel’s domestic politics and foreign relations. Obama has expressed strong reservations about the Israeli right, complaining to American Jewish leaders that “there is a strain within the pro-Israel community that says unless you adopt an unwavering pro-Likud approach to Israel then you’re anti-Israel.”[5]
Both candidates have deplored Hamas as a terrorist organization committed to Israel’s destruction. McCain’s position on Hamas has hardened considerably since 2006 when, shortly after organization’s electoral victory, he told a reporter, “They’re the government [and] sooner or later we are going to have to deal with them.”[7]
Obama and McCain also appear to diverge on the peace process’s most divisive issue: Jerusalem. Though supportive of talks to demarcate the final borders of Jerusalem, McCain has been unambiguous in his willingness to recognize unqualified Israeli sovereignty over the city, even prior to negotiations. “Jerusalem is undivided,” he declared. “Jerusalem is the capital and we should move the [U.S.] embassy to Jerusalem before anything happens.”[9]
The most fundamental distinction between McCain and Obama on the peace question stems from their perception of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its relationship to other Middle Eastern disputes. According to the Des Moines Register, Obama told Iowa voters that “nobody has suffered more than the Palestinian people,” but later claimed that he had been misquoted and had actually said that Palestinian suffering resulted from “the failure of the Palestinian leadership to recognize Israel and renounce violence.”[11]
McCain’s position, in this critical case, is unequivocal. “[I]f the Israeli-Palestinian issue were decided tomorrow,” he has maintained, “we would still face the enormous threat of radical Islamic extremism.”[13]
On the basis of this comparison, it is reasonable to expect a McCain administration to maintain and perhaps accelerate the Annapolis process initiated by Bush last November, insisting that both Israelis and Palestinians live up to the Road Map’s requisites. But McCain is unlikely to ratchet up pressure on Israel, to oppose Israeli claims to Jerusalem, or to link the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with any of the region’s manifold struggles. He will not deal with Hamas, even in context of the national unity government that the organization is currently considering with the Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. An Obama presidency, however, may well launch an entirely new initiative, one based on zero tolerance for Israeli settlement-building and checkpoints, as well as on the belief that the road to Baghdad and Teheran runs through Bethlehem and Nablus. Obama might be expected to show deeper sympathy for the Palestinian demand for a capital in Jerusalem and greater flexibility in including Hamas in negotiations, if only indirectly, through the national unity coalition with Abbas. Obama will probably seek a broader accord, including Syria as well as other Arab countries, while McCain would focus on the Israeli-Palestinian dimension. McCain’s démarche is unlikely to ruffle the U.S.-Israel relationship; Obama’s is liable to strain the alliance, especially if, as recent polls predict, Netanyahu and the Likud return to power.
How they will fight
In addition to the peace process, Israel has a cardinal interest in the candidates’ attitudes toward other Middle East-related issues, beginning with the war on terror. Here, too, President Bush established a new paradigm based on preemptive action against suspected terrorists and their backers. This aspect of the Bush Doctrine accorded well with Israel, which, since its establishment, has reserved the option to strike its enemies preemptively. Obama and McCain, however, are markedly divided over the policy and the means for battling terror in the future.
Though both have reiterated their readiness to meet terrorist threats with force, McCain has never abjured preemption, stressing his commitment “to uncover [terrorist] plots before they take root.”[14]
Further insight into the candidates’ divergent approaches to combating terror can be gleaned from their reaction to the Supreme Court’s June 12, 2008 decision granting security suspects the right to petition civilian courts. The ruling, Obama said, was “an important step toward reestablishing our credibility as a nation” and “rejecting a false choice between fighting terrorism and respecting habeas corpus.”[15]
The War on Terror, for both candidates, is inextricably linked to the conflict in Iraq. McCain sees the latter as a natural extension of the former; Obama views the second as a dangerous diversion from the first. Unlike the candidates’ stances on the peace process and the fight against terrorism, which are often open to interpretation, their statements on Iraq leave little latitude for debate.
Obama asserts that the Iraqi war has drained America’s resources and inhibited it from effectively fighting terror. He denies that the surge has sufficiently reduced violence in Iraq, compelled the Iraqi government to fulfill its sovereign responsibilities, or helped bridge the country’s ethnic differences. In keeping with the recommendation of the Iraq Study Group, he has called for a sixteen-month phasing out of the American military involvement. Apart from a “residual force” which will stay behind to guard the embassy, train Iraqi troops, and hunt down al-Qaeda, there will be no permanent American bases. Though he has acknowledged the need to make “tactical adjustments” as the withdrawal proceeds, Obama has determined that “it is time to end this end this war” and focus on Afghanistan.[17]
McCain insists that America “is winning and will win” in Iraq, which he regards as the central theater in the struggle against Islamist terror.[18]
These disparities are rife with ramifications for Israel. Long-time advocates of preemption, Israelis may be disappointed by an Obama administration that abandons the tactic and recoils from further preventative action against terrorists. They will have to grapple with the fallout of an American evacuation from Iraq, which is almost certain to be perceived in the region as an Islamist triumph. Still, Israel could benefit from a United States that is less inclined to pursue polices unilaterally and more in line with international opinion.
The situation might be reversed under McCain. The U.S. would continue to press its anti-terror campaign in the Middle East and stay the course in Iraq but remain to a large extent isolated globally. The Israeli ideal of an America that is engaged militarily in the Middle East and in synch with the international community may well prove elusive.
Addressing the Iranian challenge
Yet the ultimate crucible of the candidates’ positions affecting Israel lies not in the peace process, in the War on Terror, or even in Iraq, but rather in the burgeoning crisis with Iran. The master of Hamas and Hizbollah, the dominant partner of Syria, and the rising regional hegemon, Iran poses multiple threats to Israel’s security-and, through its nuclear program, a danger to Israel’s very existence. The Islamic regime that routinely pledges to “wipe Israel off the map” could easily transfer nuclear weapons to one of its terrorist proxies while prompting other Middle East states to achieve to develop similar armaments. Israel could soon find itself in the epicenter of a nuclear neighborhood that is relentlessly hostile and volatile. On no other issue are the Jewish State’s interests in the platforms of McCain and Obama so paramount and, potentially, existential.
As McCain’s stance on Hamas once hardened, so too has Obama’s on Iran. After initially ranking Iran with Cuba and Venezuela that “do not pose a serious threat to us the way the Soviet Union posed a threat to us,”[19]
More consistently than Obama, McCain characterized Iran as a threat to the free world, “hell-bent on the destruction of Israel, hell-bent on driving us out of Iraq, [and] hell-bent on supporting terrorist organizations.”[22]
The McCain-Obama split over Iran was poignantly reflected in their reactions to the Kyl-Lieberman Amendment passed in September 2007 and the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) issued three months later. Endorsed by three-quarters of the Senate, the amendment recognized the Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards as a terrorist group and authorized the use of “all instruments of United States national power” to protect Iraq from Iran and its proxies. Though neither senator participated in the vote, McCain hailed the bill for sending “exactly the right message-to Iran, to the region and to the world.”[24]
The Obama-McCain split over Iran presents Israel with life-and-death dilemmas. Israel would certainly gain from a president who garnered international legitimacy by exhausting all possible options with Iran, including offers to communicate, before resorting to violence. But if diplomacy fails to modify Iranian behavior and instead furnishes Tehran with time to complete its nuclear weapons program, the outcome for Israel could be catastrophic. Compounding the stakes for Israel is the fact that-according to current Israeli Defense Forces estimates, Iran will possess an operational nuclear weapon by 2009, rendering either Obama’s dialogue plan or McCain’s sanction strategy moot.[27]
Alliance in the balance
The presidential election of 2008 is arguably the most pivotal for Israel in its sixty years of existence. The next occupant of the White House can immensely influence the course of Israel’s relations with the Palestinians, the Syrians, and a range of Arab regimes. He can alter or maintain American policies on Jerusalem, the settlements, and negotiations with Hamas, and influence the shape and nature of any future Palestinian state. By upholding or disavowing preemption or by reducing or augmenting American troop strength in Iraq, he can radically sway the Middle East’s balance of power. Most fatefully, in his determination to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weaponry, he can fortify Israel’s security, if not ensure its survival.
Four months is a long time in a national election, especially one so heatedly contested and close. The Middle East, the world’s most protean region, is supremely subject to change. No doubt the candidates will adjust their positions as circumstances shift; they will persist in conveying different messages to different audiences, in clarifying and qualifying their stands.
Yet, in spite of these correctives, the core platforms are unlikely to change. While both aspirants will honor Bush’s pro-Israel legacy and actively pursue peace, McCain would be less prone than Obama to pressure Israel for concessions and more inclined to take the Palestinian Authority to task for its Road Map infractions. Obama may prove more flexible than McCain in admitting some role for Hamas in negotiations and recognizing Palestinian claims to Jerusalem. McCain would preserve and Obama would renounce much of his predecessor’s policies on preemption and the war on terror; Obama intends to remove American troops from Iraq and McCain plans to retain them. Though unwilling to rule out any option vis-à-vis Iran, Obama wants first to talk with Ahmadinejad and other Iranian leaders. McCain rules out dialogue but prefers to levy intensified sanctions on Iran before resorting to force.
Gaining an appreciation of these aspects of Obama and McCain platforms will remain vital for supporters of Israel, irrespective of what they think is “best” for it. For them, this analysis can continue as a constructive guide throughout the period leading up to November 4th, and thereafter, a useful reference for the next president of the United States.

[1]
[2]
[3]
http://jeffreygoldberg.theatlantic.com/archives/2008/05/obama_on_zionism_and_hamas.php
[4]
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/06/mccains_speech_to_aipac.html
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
http://jeffreygoldberg.theatlantic.com/archives/2008/05/obama_on_zionism_and_hamas.php
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/06/mccains_speech_to_aipac.html
[24]
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/06/mccains_speech_to_aipac.html
[25]
[26]
[27]
Mr. Oren is senior fellow at the Shalem Center and the author of Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present, (W.W. Norton, 2007).